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Results for Third Quarter Ending 30 September 2026

JAKARTA, November 2, 2026 - Wintermar reports a 67.6%YOY jump in Operating Profit to US$24.7million for 9M2026 on 30.0%YOY revenue growth, supported by margin improvement from additional high-tier vessels in operation and better charter rates.

Owned Vessel Division

Owned Vessel revenue grew by 30.9%YOY to US$65.8million in 9M2026 with 2 units of additional DP vessels operational compared to 9M2025 while charter rates remained firm. Gross margin for Owned Vessels widened to 45.3% in 9M2026 compared to 40.0% in 9M2025 as there were more high tier vessels in operation this year. Fleet utilization remained stable at 60% in 9M2026 against 9M2025, although 3Q2026 utilization fell to 54% compared to 62% in 2Q2026, due to 3 high tier vessels completing long-term contracts. As a result of some delays in the tenders for long-term contracts, there are more vessels working on spot contracts which have resulted in short-term fluctuations in the utilization rate. The consolidation of Fast Offshore Supply Pte. Ltd. (FOS) for the first time in 3Q2026 offset some of there venue reduction from the core business. A few vessels are being prepared for deployment in 4Q2026, which has added to direct expenses but should improve utilization for the rest of the year.

Chartering and Other Marine Services

In line with management strategy to prioritise owned vessels division and boost fee-based income, chartering revenue continued to decline 20.5%YOY to US$3.2million with gross profit of US$0.2million.

Conversely, revenue from Other Marine Services rose by 68.2%YOY to US$6.9million for 9M2026, with gross profit from this division increasing by 42.8%YOY to US$2.0million.

Direct Expenses and Gross Profit

Direct Expenses for Owned Vessels rose by 19.2%YOY to US$36.0million for 9M2026, largely from the consolidation of FOS vessels for the first time in 3Q2026 after the acquisition was completed end of 1H2026.

Depreciation rose by 23.7%YOY to US$13.0million after including the FOS fleet in 3Q2026, as well as 2 additional Wintermar group vessels which began operation. Crewing costs rose by 25.2%YOY to US$10.2million, while fuel bunker costs increased by 46.8%YOY to US$2.6million from higher fuel prices and preparation for mobilization to long term contracts in 4Q2026. Operations expenses only increasing marginally by 4.4%YOY to US$3.6million and maintenance costs rose to US$6.6million from US$6.3million in 9M2025. Expenses from Other Marine Services rose 81.4% in line with the increase in income from the same division with more fee based services recorded.

Total Gross Profit jumped by 46.7%YOY in 9M2026 to US$32.1million, with the Owned Vessel Division contributing US$29.8million.

Indirect Expenses and Operating Profit

Total Indirect Expenses increased by 3.3%YOY to US$7.4million in 9M2026, of which the largest expense, staff salary only increased by 1.4%YOY to US$5.0million. Traveling costs rose by 61.1% to US$0.1million driven by increase of ongoing operations outside Indonesia. Administrative expenses and professional fees increased by 14.4%YOY and 20.6%YOY respectively, mainly from costs associated with new bank loans and the acquisition of FOS. Office depreciation increased by 5.7% and office utility by 23.5%, mainly due to the addition of FOS's administrative and office assets following the acquisition.

Operating Profit rose by 67.6%YOY to US$24.7million in 9M2026, reflecting a widening operating margin from 25.2% in 9M2025 to 32.5% in 9M2026.

Other Income, Expenses and Net Attributable Profit

Interest expenses rose by 42.0%YOY to US$2.2million and interest income rose by 16.4%YOY to US$0.9million. The higher interest expenses reflect the Company's strategy of fleet expansion, which is financed by cash flow followed by refinancing through bank leverage once the vessels commence operation. At the end of 9M2026, WINS’ net gearing, after the consolidation of bank debt and cash from FOS, is 29%.

Associated Companies recorded a loss of US$0.4million due to lower vessel utilization. A forex loss of US$0.5million was incurred in 9M2026 on the portion of the Company's cash held in Rupiah, due to Rupiah’s depreciation during the period.

Net gain on sale of fixed assets fell by 4.2%YOY to US$1.6million due to lower vessel sale proceeds compared to last year, with one FOS vessel sold to a third party in 3Q2026. In addition, other income rose significantly to US$4.1million, mainly from the recovery of impaired receivables at FOS.

Including the one-off gain, Total Attributable Net Profit rose by 91.9%YOY to US$17.7million compared to US$9.2million in 9M2025. Earnings per share rose to Rp70.5 in 9M2026 from Rp34.5 in 9M2025.

EBITDA rose by 49.0%YOY to US$37.9million for 9M2026, compared to US$25.5million in 9M2025.

Industry Outlook

The interim truce in the Iran conflict broke down in July with attacks on shipping in the Strait of Hormuz intensifying in October after the lack of progress on diplomatic resolution. The continued disruption highlights the risks of relying on Middle Eastern oil supply. With Brent crude averaging over US$114 per barrel in September, global oil and gas investment has been steadily rising. Westwood Research has forecasted offshore field development capital expenditure to jump by 30%YOY in 2026.

In Indonesia, the Government continues to push exploration in 2026 with the 5 Strategic National Projects (PSN) worth US$48.1billion that have all reached key milestones.

As these projects move into the construction and installation stage from 2027, there will be a concurrent demand for high-tier Offshore Support Vessels to support these domestic projects. Wintermar has been positioning our fleet to benefit.

Globally, the OSV fleet remains tight. Westwood expects OSV utilization to rise above 79% in 2027, while more than half of the operational fleet is now over 15 years old. With very limited newbuilding since 2015, vessel supply is expected to remain tight in the coming years, particularly for dynamic positioning-enabled PSVs, pointing to higher charter rates.

Business Strategy

As detailed in our previous newsletter, Wintermar’s strategy has been to grow the core business through purchasing secondhand vessels while ordering newly built vessels to renew and upgrade the high value fleet. The acquisition of FOS in June 2026 has added significant visibility of earnings to the Group as a result of the 5 year newbuild CTV charter contracts in 2027 and shipbuilding deliveries in 2028.

Our fleet renewal plan for the core business is now well underway. The 8th PSV that was purchased last year will start operations in November. In July 2026, we purchased 2 second-hand diesel-electric (DE) vessels, of which one unit of DE Anchor Handling Tug Supply (AHTS) commenced operations in September, while the other vessel, a Multi Role Support Vessel (MSV), will be operationally ready in 1H2027. In addition, under our newbuild strategy, one PSV and two MSVs are expected to be delivered in 2H2027.

Through FOS, we have acquired 6 units of existing FMPVs, of which 2 have long-term contracts. FOS is currently building the first 5 units of brand new CTVs, which have been contracted for 5 years with options and will be operational starting from 1Q2027, with the first unit already in the sea trial stage. In addition, FOS will deliver another 5 CTVs to a client in 1H2028 through its shipbuilding business.

2026 has been a year of investing in future growth through capital expenditure, leveraging on the balance sheet to improve our fleet composition with focus on high value vessels. As the shipbuilding at FOS progresses, net gearing will continue to rise before the vessels are completed and commence operations in 2027.

Total contracts on hand as at end September 2026, including FOS, amounted to US$200million, of which around 75% are international contracts.

Ms. Pek Swan Layanto, CFA
Investor Relations
PT Wintermar Offshore Marine Tbk
Tel (62-21) 530 5201 Ext 401
Email: [email protected]

DISCLAIMER

Certain statements made in this publication involve a number of risks and uncertainties that could cause actual results to differ materially from those projected. Certain statements relating to business and operations of PT Wintermar Offshore Marine Tbk and Subsidiaries (the Company) are based on management’s expectations, estimates and projections. These statements are not guarantees of future performance and involve risks, uncertainties and assumptions that are difficult to predict. Certain statements are based upon assumptions as to future events that may not prove to be accurate. Therefore, actual outcomes and results may differ materially from what is expressed or forecasted in such statements. The Company makes no commitment, and disclaims any duty, to update or revise any of these statements. This publication is for informational purposes only and is not intended as a solicitation or offering of securities in any jurisdiction. The information contained in this publication is not intended to qualify, supplement or amend information disclosed under corporate and securities legislation of any jurisdiction applicable to the Company and should not be relied upon for the purpose of making investment decisions concerning any securities of the Company.

  1. AISAP助中港照相打通O2O 旗下AV Life及快圖美推個人化顧客體驗Companies: SAP香港, 2026年11月2日 - 隨着全渠道零售及體驗經濟的興起，消費者對個人化服務的需求日益提升。業務涵蓋影音零售、影像沖印、美容健康及商用視聽系統整合的中港照相器材集團有限公司（下稱「中港照相集團」），旗下兩大核心零售品牌——高級影音連鎖店 AV Life（生活影音）及全港最大相片沖印連鎖店快圖美（Fotomax），全面引進 SAP Engagement Cloud，整合線上線下顧客數據及互動，針對不同客群優化消費旅程，提供更個人化的顧客體驗，為品牌賦予了更強大的市場敏捷性與業務擴展空間。 全港擁有超過 10 間分店的 AV Life，在引進 SAP Engagement Cloud 後，成功助力品牌為顧客帶來了連貫式顧客體驗。顧客在門市親身體驗影音產品並獲得專業解答後，前線店員可即時產生附帶專屬優惠碼的電子報價單。顧客隨後不論選擇在實體店還是電商平台下單，皆能享有同等優惠。更重要的是，系統能自動將銷售業績公平歸功於源頭引流的實體門市及銷售員，在賦予消費者極大購買自由度的同時，有效解決了線上線下的渠道衝突，並利用自動化跟進機制大幅提升交易轉化率。 快圖美FOTOMAX在全港設有超過 54 間分店，其業務核心在於滿足顧客高頻率、由情感驅動的消費需求。SAP Engagement Cloud 助力數據整合支持，促成品牌將約 33 萬名會員的線上與線下足跡統一化，形成清晰的單一客戶視圖。團隊可根據「生活階段」（如新婚家庭、Gen Z、旅遊愛好者或寵物主人）對會員進行智能細分，並在合適的時機發送關懷與提醒（例如：寶寶百日宴或畢業季節的相簿沖印提醒）。這種以數據為依歸的互動，對消費者而言更像是貼心提醒而非生硬推銷，在維持精簡營運團隊的架構下，成功深化了客戶黏著度、帶動重複光顧率並提升了平均客單價。這套自動化提醒的打開點閱率高達 47%，超越平常群發電郵的 42%，客戶購買率更提升至 14%，與常規群發的 0.4% 相比，增幅非常驚人。 中港照相器材集團有限公司行政總裁孫道弘表示：「數碼化轉型不僅是提升零售效率的工具，更是推動業務敏捷性與策略決策的核心保障。過往各個品牌與團隊往往受限於不同的業績指標，而 SAP Engagement Cloud 的落地，成功協助我們打破了傳統壁壘，讓前線行銷與後勤支援團隊能夠基於同一個客戶全貌緊密協作。將顧客體驗提升為整個集團層面的核心能力，協助我們在多變的零售環境中靈活調度、穩健前行，為未來的持續增長打下堅實基礎。」 SAP 香港及澳門地區總經理聶德慧表示：「香港零售業擁有多元品牌及豐富的顧客服務經驗，具備持續創新的優勢。我們很高興與中港照相集團合作， SAP Engagement Cloud致力 打通線上線下的顧客互動，協助 AV Life 和快圖美按不同客群的需要提供個人化體驗，同時促進跨渠道協作，提升營運效率。這次合作展現了雲端科技如何幫助企業將顧客數據轉化為實際業務價值。展望未來，我們期待進一步深化與中港照相集團的合作，並與更多香港零售企業攜手，推動數碼轉型及持續增長。」 關於SAP 作為企業應用和商業AI的全球領導者，SAP位於商業和技術的交匯點。50多年來，企業一直信賴SAP通過整合財務、採購、人力資源、供應鏈和客戶體驗等核心業務營運，來發揮其最佳表現。如需瞭解更多SAP資訊，請瀏覽https://www.sap.com/hk 。 如要查詢更多資訊，請聯絡（只限傳媒）： 縱橫公共關係顧問集團 （SPRG） 崔駿宏（Andico Tsui） 電話：2114 4346 / 6902 3831 電郵：[email protected] 傳真：2114 0880
  2. FinanceSAP Helps CHKP Group Connect Online and Offline Retail to Deliver Personalised Experiences at AV Life and FOTOMAXCompanies: SAPHong Kong, Nov 2, 2026 - As omnichannel retail and the experience economy grow, consumers increasingly expect personalised service. China-Hongkong Photo Products Holdings Limited (“CHKP Group”), whose businesses span audiovisual retail, photo printing, beauty & wellness, and commercial audiovisual systems integration, has implemented SAP Engagement Cloud across its two core retail brands: premium audiovisual chain AV Life and FOTOMAX, Hong Kong’s largest photo printing chain. By integrating online and offline customer data and interactions, the Group can tailor customer journeys to different segments, deliver personalised experiences and enhance business agility and growth potential. AV Life, which operates more than 10 stores across Hong Kong, uses SAP Engagement Cloud to help deliver a seamless shopping experience. After customers try products and receive expert advice in-store, sales staff can instantly generate electronic quotations with unique promotional codes. Customers receive the same offers whether they purchase in-store or online. The system automatically credits sales to the originating store and salesperson, giving customers greater purchasing flexibility while resolving online and offline channel conflicts. Automated follow-ups also significantly improve sales conversion rates. FOTOMAX operates more than 54 stores across Hong Kong, serving customers’ frequent, emotionally driven purchasing needs. SAP Engagement Cloud contributed to unifying online and offline interactions for approximately 330,000 members, creating a single customer view. The team can segment members by life stage and profile—including newlyweds, Gen Z consumers, travel enthusiasts and pet owners—and send timely reminders, such as photo album printing prompts for a baby’s 100-day celebration or graduation season. These relevant messages feel like thoughtful reminders rather than sales pitches, strengthening loyalty, encouraging repeat purchases and increasing average transaction value while maintaining a lean operations team. Automated reminders achieved an email open rate of 47%, compared with 42% for standard bulk emails, and a customer purchase rate of 14%, compared with 0.4%. “Digital transformation is not just about improving retail efficiency; it also enables business agility and strategic decision-making,” said Stanley Sun, Chief Executive Officer of China-Hongkong Photo Products Holdings Limited. “Our brands and teams previously worked towards different performance targets. SAP Engagement Cloud supported our efforts to break down these silos, enabling frontline marketing and back-office teams to collaborate around a shared customer view. Making customer experience a Group-wide capability helps us respond flexibly to a changing retail environment and build a solid foundation for sustained growth.” “Hong Kong’s diverse retail brands and extensive customer service expertise provide a strong foundation for continued innovation,” said Winnie Nieh, General Manager, SAP Hong Kong and Macau. “We are delighted to work with CHKP Group. SAP Engagement Cloud aims to connect online and offline customer interactions, helping AV Life and FOTOMAX deliver personalised experiences while improving cross-channel collaboration and operational efficiency. This partnership demonstrates how cloud technology can help organisations turn customer data into tangible business value. We look forward to deepening our collaboration with CHKP Group and working with more Hong Kong retailers to drive digital transformation and sustained growth.” About SAP As a global leader in enterprise applications and business AI, SAP (NYSE:SAP) stands at the nexus of business and technology. For over 50 years, organizations have trusted SAP to bring out their best by uniting business-critical operations spanning finance, procurement, HR, supply chain, and customer experience. For more information, visit https://www.sap.com/hk ‚ For media enquiries, please contact: Strategic Public Relations Group (SPRG): Andico Tsui [email protected] +852 2114 4346 / 6902 3831
  3. RetailVietnam's E-Commerce Grew 44% in 2026. Its Parcel Count Grew 13.7%, and the Gap Is the StoryHONG KONG, Nov 2, 2026 - In the first half of 2026, four platforms sold VND 291.6 trillion of goods in Vietnam. That is the number in the 2026 slide pack, usually rendered as 44.11% growth, usually followed by the sentence that the market has never been stronger. The same deck will tell you that in the first half of 2026 Shopee led with 54.5% and TikTok Shop closed at 43.4%, that official Mall stores are the only safe place to sell, and that the tax authorities have finally closed the loophole that let cross-border sellers undercut everyone. Each of those sentences is defensible on its own. Taken together they describe a market that is growing at more than twice the rate of the parcels moving through it, in which the two leaders hold 97.9% of the money and an unknown share of the sellers, and in which a compliance regime that began in February 2025 has had eighteen months to change behaviour. Whether it has is a question nobody in the deck answers, because the deck is selling the growth line and the growth line is doing the work. This piece takes the four claims one at a time. Where a number is solid, I say so. Where two official-looking numbers disagree, I put them side by side rather than picking the flattering one. Where the arithmetic does not reproduce a figure that everyone repeats, I show the division. The Claim, as It Appears in the Deck The version I keep hearing in Hanoi and Ho Chi Minh City goes like this. Vietnamese e-commerce is the fastest-growing large market in Southeast Asia; it grew 44% in the first half of 2026 to VND 291.6 trillion, or about US$11.1 billion at the prevailing rate; Shopee and TikTok Shop together hold 97.9% of it; Mall stores, 2.79% of the store count, now take 34.2% of revenue; and the 2025 tax decrees have pushed the grey-market cross-border sellers out, which is why the growth is finally "healthy". The people saying this are not lying, and most of them have a source. The problem is that the sources measure different things, on different windows, with different denominators, and the composite sentence they produce is not something any single dataset supports. Start with the one figure that travels furthest: 44.11%. It appears in a presentation by the E-commerce Development Centre, a unit under the Ministry of Industry and Trade, reported in October 2026 with the accompanying shares of 54.5% and 43.4%. It is a revenue figure for four platforms, and it is real in the sense that someone computed it from platform data. What it is not is a like-for-like growth rate, and the reason is visible in a second number published five weeks earlier. Two Numbers for One Half-Year, 26.8 Trillion Dong Apart On 12 August 2026, the Vietnam office of China's Ministry of Commerce relayed a report from Nguoi Lao Dong on the same six months. The figure there was VND 264.8 trillion, growth of 19%, down from 23% in the first half of 2025. Shopee 54.5%. TikTok Shop 43.4%. Same period. Same shares, to one decimal place. Two totals for the same six months of 2026 that differ by VND 26.8 trillion, and two growth rates that differ by 25 percentage points. Table 1: One half-year, two published totals Source H1 2026 GMV (VND trillion) Stated growth Implied H1 2025 base (VND trillion) YouNet ECI, via Nguoi Lao Dong, 12 Aug 2026 264.8 +19% 222.5 E-commerce Development Centre, Oct 2026 291.6 +44.11% 202.4 Difference 26.8 25.1 points 20.1 The implied bases are the interesting part. Divide the August 2026 figure of 264.8 by 1.19 and you get 222.5. Divide the October 2026 figure of 291.6 by 1.4411 and you get 202.4. Neither base is obviously wrong, but they cannot both be the true 2025 half-year. One dataset has restated the base downward by VND 20.1 trillion, which is roughly what happens when a measurement house tightens its panel, drops a category it used to count, or switches from GMV booked at order creation to GMV net of cancellations and returns. That is not a scandal. It is what panel data does. But it means the sentence "the market grew 44%" and the sentence "growth slowed from 23% to 19%" are both being published in the same year about the same six months, and the second one is the one that matters for anyone deciding whether to hire a warehouse team in Binh Duong. My reading, and it is a reading rather than a finding: the 44.11% is a revenue-based growth rate off a restated base, and the 19% is a like-for-like growth rate off the original base. The shares agree because shares are computed inside each dataset and are robust to restatement. The growth rates do not agree because growth is exactly the thing a restatement moves. There is a test that would settle it, and it is cheap. Ask both houses for their 2024 and 2025 half-year totals on the current panel definition. If the 2025 base comes back near 202.4, the 44% is arithmetic and the 19% is a different panel. If it comes back near 222.5, the 44% is a base effect dressed as growth. Nobody in the deck has asked. Myth One: TikTok Shop Has Already Passed Shopee The most confidently repeated claim in the market is that TikTok Shop has overtaken Shopee in Vietnam. It has not, in any dataset I can find, and the claim survives because a rolling twelve-month window can be made to say almost anything. In October 2026, Metric published a twelve-month rolling series to April 2026 showing TikTok Shop at roughly US$5.96 billion and a 44% share, up from 33%, with Shopee down from 61% to 53%. That is a real finding: a ten-point swing in twelve months. Read quickly, it says the leader is about to be passed. Read carefully, it says the challenger gained ten points and is still nine behind. The half-year data says the same thing more soberly. In the first half of 2026 it was Shopee 54.5%, TikTok Shop 43.4%, a gap of 11.1 points. In the first half of 2025 the gap was wider. The direction is not in dispute. The crossing is. And the mechanism behind the narrowing has already weakened. TikTok Shop's revenue grew 27% in the first half of 2026, against 148% in the same period of 2025. When a challenger's growth falls by four-fifths while the leader grows 15%, the gap stops closing at the rate the rolling chart implies. Extrapolating a twelve-month swing into a crossing date is the single most common error in this market's commentary, and it is an error of arithmetic, not of judgement. Why the claim spreads is worth one paragraph, because it is not stupidity. Platform-share stories are how agencies sell services. "The incumbent is finished" is a better pitch than "the incumbent has 54.5% and is growing 15%", and the rolling window supplies a chart that looks like a crossing. The chart is honest. The sentence attached to it is not. Myth Two: Forty-Four Percent Growth Means Consumers Are Buying More Here the arithmetic is simple enough to do on a phone, and it changes the story completely. In the first half of 2026 revenue grew 44.11% while units sold grew 13.67%. Divide one by the other and the average order value rose 26.8%. In dong terms, the average basket went from about VND 371,000 to VND 470,000 if you take the E-commerce Development Centre's own totals and the reported unit growth, and NielsenIQ's separate measurement puts the basket at US$14.20, up US$1.80 year on year, which is 14.5% in dollar terms and consistent in direction. So the market did not sell 44% more things. It sold 13.7% more things at 26.8% higher prices. Those are different facts with different consequences. Table 2: What the growth is made of Component H1 2026 change What it implies Platform revenue +44.11% The headline Units sold +13.67% Volume demand Implied average order value +26.8% Mix and price, not volume Active stores with revenue about 436,000 A thinning seller base Stores excluding Mall -27% year on year Exit, not entry A 26.8% rise in basket size in six months is not a normal consumption pattern. It is what happens when the cheapest categories shrink, when subsidy-driven low-ticket orders stop being worth fulfilling, and when the platforms stop paying for growth. YouNet ECI's own analyst put it plainly in August 2026: the market is entering a stable phase that tracks overall retail rather than outgrowing it on platform incentives. That is a mature-market sentence. It is being printed underneath a 44% headline. Both are in the same report. For a seller, the difference is decisive. Volume growth of 13.7% supports a fulfilment and packaging business. Price-led growth of 26.8% supports brands, authorised distributors, and anyone who can defend a price. Vietnam's own data says the second group is winning: Mall stores are 2.79% of stores and 34.2% of revenue, their count fell 6% while their revenue rose 54%, and the average Mall store's revenue rose about 63.8%. Myth Three: The Small Seller Is the Backbone Every market entry memo about Vietnam contains a version of this line: the market is fragmented, small sellers dominate, and a platform that serves them will inherit the growth. The store-count data points the other way. About 436,000 stores generated revenue on the major platforms in the first half of 2026. The number of ordinary, non-Mall stores fell 27% year on year in the first half of 2026. Mall stores fell 6% in count but rose 54% in revenue. Average revenue per store rose 44% on Shopee and 65% on TikTok Shop in the first six months of 2026. Put those together and you get a market where the seller base is contracting while revenue per surviving seller is rising. That is consolidation, and it is happening faster on the platform usually described as the small seller's friend. TikTok Shop's store-level average grew 65% because the stores that remained were better, not because the ones that left were replaced. The consequence is structural rather than moral. A platform whose growth comes from 436,000 surviving stores has less need for the long tail than one whose growth comes from store count. That shows up in take rates, in traffic allocation, and in how much a new seller has to spend on live-commerce production before the algorithm notices them. The long tail is not the customer any more. It is the inventory. The 25x That Nobody Can Reproduce Here is a small case of a number that has escaped its source. The claim, repeated in Chinese and Vietnamese trade coverage through 2026, is that a Mall store's average revenue is 25 times that of an ordinary store. The two inputs are solid: Mall stores are 2.79% of stores and 34.2% of revenue. Do the division. A Mall store's revenue index is 34.2 divided by 2.79, which is 12.3 times the all-store average. An ordinary store's index is 67.7 divided by 97.21, which is 0.696 times the average. The ratio between them is 17.6, not the 25 that 2026 trade coverage reports. Table 3: The Mall premium, recomputed Measure Mall stores Ordinary stores Ratio Share of store count 2.79% 97.21% 0.029 Share of revenue 34.2% 67.7% 0.505 Revenue index vs all stores 12.3 0.70 17.6 Seventeen-point-six times is still an enormous premium. It is not 25, and the gap between 17.6 and 25 is the difference between a fact and a slogan. If a plan assumes a Mall listing triples a seller's revenue relative to an ordinary listing, this arithmetic says it does something closer to eighteen times, which should make anyone suspicious of the plan rather than reassured by it. Numbers that flatter too much are usually measuring something else. Myth Four: The Tax Net Closes the Door The fourth claim is the one I have the most sympathy for, because the policy changes are real and they are recent. On 18 February 2025, Decision 01/2025/QD-TTg ended the VAT exemption for imported parcels valued at VND 1 million or less. Since February 2025 customs has run an automated collection mechanism against a flow of 4 to 5 million low-value orders a day. From 1 July 2025, Decree 117/2025/ND-CP required platforms with payment functions to withhold and remit tax on behalf of household and individual sellers. From 1 January 2026, the unified flat-rate regime was replaced: platforms with payment functions withhold VAT and personal income tax at source, platforms without a payment function leave the seller to declare, and sellers under VND 200 million in revenue can claim a refund of what was withheld. Decree 68/2026/ND-CP set the household-business threshold at VND 500 million of revenue, not profit. That is a genuine tightening. It is not a door closing, and the arithmetic of who it hurts is more specific than the commentary suggests. Table 4: The cost stack for a seller turning over VND 5 billion a year Line Basis Annual cost (VND million) Share of revenue Platform commission at 7.5% Low end of published Q2 2026 rate cards 375.0 7.5% Platform commission at 9.5% High end of the same cards 475.0 9.5% VAT withheld on goods 1% of revenue 50.0 1.0% Personal income tax withheld 0.5% of revenue 25.0 0.5% Total platform and tax cost Commission plus 1.5% 450.0 to 550.0 9.0% to 11.0% Reported total operating cost 30% of GMV, Momentum Works 1,500.0 30.0% Read the last two rows together. In the 2026 schedule the tax that everyone is arguing about is 1.5% of revenue. The platform take in the Q2 2026 rate cards is 7.5% to 9.5%. Total seller operating cost, including fulfilment, returns, livestream production and ads, is around 30% of GMV in the 2026 Momentum Works estimate. The withholding decree moved the smallest line in the stack, and it moved it in a way that a seller can plan for, because it is a percentage rather than a negotiation. What the decrees actually changed is the floor. A seller who cannot absorb 1.5% was never covering 30%. A seller who can now has a cost line that is predictable, which is worth something to anyone trying to borrow against future cash flow. The grey-market operators who were arbitraging the VAT exemption on VND 200,000 items lost an edge worth about VND 20,000 a parcel. That is a real loss and a small one. The commentary that says the net "closes the door" also tends to get the rate wrong. One widely circulated advisory puts the platform withholding at 5% VAT plus personal income tax. The 5% rate is the services schedule. Goods distribution in Vietnam is 1% VAT plus 0.5% personal income tax, a combined 1.5%, which is what the decree applies to marketplace sales of physical goods. In 2026 a seller who budgets 5% will over-reserve by more than three times, and a seller who reads only the Chinese-language summaries will conclude the market has become uninvestable when it has become 1.5% more expensive. What the Withholding Actually Changed Three things, and none of them is exit. First, it made revenue visible. Once the platform withholds at source, the seller's declared revenue and the platform's transaction record are the same number. That ends a specific kind of under-declaration, and it also ends the practice of using a partner's name to open a store while declaring only withdrawals. Second, it moved compliance cost onto the platform. Shopee's cost of services was US$9.5 billion in FY2025 and its sales and marketing expense US$3.55 billion. A withholding obligation is an engineering and reconciliation cost of a few million dollars, not a strategic threat to a company of that size. For a five-person seller, the same obligation is a monthly accounting task. Third, it made the small-seller exemption a cliff rather than a slope. The VND 500 million threshold under Decree 68/2026 is revenue, not profit, and a seller doing VND 40 million a month crosses it in month thirteen. There is no phase-in. That cliff, not the 1.5%, is the part of the policy that will change behaviour, because it punishes growth at a specific revenue point. What Survives the Debunking Four claims, four different outcomes. The 44% is real as a published number and unreliable as a growth rate; the same six months also grew 19% depending on the panel. TikTok Shop has closed ten points and has not crossed; the crossing story depends on a rolling window and a growth rate that has already collapsed from 148% to 27%. The small seller is not the backbone; the seller base shrank 27% while revenue per survivor rose, and Mall stores at 2.79% of count take 34.2% of revenue. The tax net did tighten, by 1.5% of revenue on goods, not by the 5% that some advisories report, and its real effect is a cliff at VND 500 million rather than a wall at the border. What is left is a market that is consolidating, ageing into price-led growth, and becoming legible to the tax authority for the first time. That is a less exciting story than the one in the deck and a much more useful one, because each of those three adjectives implies a different investment. If you want one indicator to settle the whole argument, watch the gap between revenue growth and unit growth. In a healthy volume market the two converge. In the first half of 2026 they were 30.4 percentage points apart. If that gap narrows to single digits while revenue growth holds above 15%, the market is genuinely selling more to more people, and the 44% was a base effect. If revenue growth falls to 15% and the gap stays wide, Vietnam has imported the Korean pattern: a mature, brand-led, price-driven market where the platforms are utilities and the growth story is over. Both are fine outcomes. They require opposite plans. Data Basis: Six Numbers, Six Documents Every figure above traces to a document, and the method is reproducible. · The H1 2026 platform total of VND 291.6 trillion and the 44.11% growth rate come from the E-commerce Development Centre presentation reported on 10 October 2026 in Hue, alongside the 54.5% and 43.4% shares. · The VND 264.8 trillion total and 19% growth rate come from YouNet ECI's H1 2026 report as relayed by Nguoi Lao Dong on 12 August 2026 and republished by the Vietnam office of China's Ministry of Commerce. · Unit growth of 13.67%, the 2.79% Mall store share, the 34.2% Mall revenue share, the 436,000 revenue-generating stores and the 27% decline in ordinary stores come from Metric's October 2026 release. · The VND 1 million VAT threshold, the 4 to 5 million daily low-value parcels, Decree 117/2025 and Decree 68/2026 come from Vietnamese customs and tax guidance as summarised by two trade advisories in 2026. · The 30% seller operating cost, the 89% to 85% platform share of total e-commerce and the US$9.5 billion Shopee cost of services come from Momentum Works' Southeast Asia report and Sea's FY2025 disclosure. · Basket size of US$14.20 and the 41.5% cash-on-delivery share come from NielsenIQ and State Bank of Vietnam data cited in the same trade reports. The two growth rates were not reconciled because the underlying panels were not published. I have said which one I think is like-for-like and why, and marked it as a reading rather than a finding. Anyone with access to both houses' 2024 and 2025 half-year totals can settle it in an afternoon, and until someone does, the honest version of the headline is a range: somewhere between 19% and 44%, with the shares agreeing and the growth disagreeing. Sources · YouNet ECI via Nguoi Lao Dong, republished by MOFCOM Vietnam 🔗 — Vietnam e-commerce growth slows in H1 2026, 12 August 2026 · E-commerce Development Centre, Ministry of Industry and Trade, via Vietnam.vn 🔗 — Hue e-commerce conference reporting H1 2026 totals, 9 October 2026 · Metric.vn data via 10100.com 🔗 — Vietnam platform shares and Mall store economics, October 2026 · Momentum Works, Southeast Asia E-Commerce 2026 🔗 — regional GMV, platform shares and seller cost structure, April 2026 · Vietnam Government, Decision 01/2025/QD-TTg as summarised by 10100.com 🔗 — end of the low-value import VAT exemption, February 2025 · Vietnam tax and e-commerce decree summary, ASEAN trade briefing 🔗 — Decree 117/2025 and Decree 68/2026 withholding rules, July 2026 · Bain, e-Conomy SEA 2026 🔗 — regional digital economy totals including Vietnam, October 2026 This article was prepared by the expert team at Global Infinity Labs, drawing on insights and data provided through its MCP data services. About Global Infinity Labs Global Infinity Labs is an AI innovation company specializing in MCP data services. Email: [email protected]
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Finance秋季兩大燈展及國際環保博覽吸引約62,000名買家到場香港, 2026年11月2日 - 2026年10月30日，由香港貿易發展局（香港貿發局）主辦的第28屆香港國際秋季燈飾展（秋燈展）、第11屆香港國際戶外及科技照明博覽，以及由香港貿發局、法蘭克福展覽（香港）有限公司合辦，並由香港特別行政區政府環境及生態局協辦的第21屆國際環保博覽圓滿結束。三項展覽合共吸引來自152個國家及地區、約62,000名買家入場參觀採購。香港以外的買家主要來自中國內地、台灣、印度、韓國、美國，以及東盟國家包括印尼、菲律賓及泰國等。 第28屆香港國際秋季燈飾展、第11屆香港國際戶外及科技照明博覽，以及第21屆國際環保博覽圓滿結束。三項展覽合共吸引來自152個國家及地區、約62,000名買家入場參觀採購。 香港貿易發展局副總裁朱耀昌表示：「三大展覽反應熱烈，充分體現香港作為國際商貿平台的優勢，以及貿發局展覽的吸引力。秋季燈飾展及國際戶外及科技照明博覽集中展示智慧互聯、健康照明以至LED顯示技術等創新方案；國際環保博覽則進一步提升國際參與程度，匯聚綠色創新科技，吸引環球政府機構及行業協會參與，更首設東盟館及『出海全球通』專區，為業界提供B2G、B2B及B2C的對接機會，進一步促進跨地域合作，充分展現香港『內聯外通』優勢，配合香港首個五年規劃及最新一份《施政報告》，支援內地與國際市場對接，助力企業出海，為照明及綠色產業創造更多機遇。」 國際環保博覽首度增設「出海全球通」專區，協助內地環保企業免費配對專業服務，與香港服務供應商拼船出海，拓展環球市場。 燈展調查：受訪者對未來兩年整體銷售感樂觀 尤其看好中國內地、中東及東盟市場 在秋燈展和戶外及科技照明博覽舉行期間，大會委託獨立調查機構訪問逾740名展商及買家。調查結果顯示，63%受訪者預期未來兩年銷售額有所增長、34%受訪者則預期維持平穩。其中，以中國內地 (85%)、中東 (84%)、及東盟國家 (84%)市場最被看好。 產品趨勢方面，受訪者認為人工智能 (54%)、技術開發 (44%)及智慧城市發展 (43%)會成為行業增長的三大推動力。智慧城市與智能家居是未來科技發展的重要方向，86%受訪者認為，未來兩年智能照明市場的發展潛力為理想及非常理想。其中以家居自動與智能照明控制系統 (39%) 及節能照明控制方案 (30%) 兩大範疇最為樂觀。 燈展雲集領先智慧照明方案 助力品牌開拓環球商機 今屆兩大燈展以「未來照明 超越所見」為題，展示最新的照明創新產品及解決方案。秋燈展焦點展區「互聯照明館」雲集約70個本地及國際頂尖品牌。來自荷蘭的頂尖照明品牌Signify聯同 Mercedes-AMG PETRONAS F1 車隊帶來賽車模擬駕駛體驗，以創新照明技術，將螢幕內的賽車氛圍延伸至現實空間，打造更具沉浸感的觀賽及娛樂體驗。Signify OEM大中華區總經理江承志表示：「我們參與秋燈展已有十多年，展會卓越的國際定位，成為我們拓展全球版圖不可或缺的重要平台。我們與來自歐洲、中東、南美和北美的國際買家與設計師建立緊密聯繫，成功推動我們的業務發展。僅在展會首兩天，我們的團隊就與100多位專業買家交換了聯繫方式，並識別出20至30位具有高度合作潛力的買家。值得一提的是，透過延續自2023年香港貿發局燈飾展的合作夥伴關係，我們與一位中國內地客戶保持著蓬勃發展的業務往來，當中每年的營業額達到人民幣1,500萬元。」 焦點展區「互聯照明館」雲集約70個頂尖品牌。當中，Signify聯同 Mercedes-AMG PETRONAS F1 車隊帶來賽車模擬駕駛體驗，以創新照明技術，將螢幕內的賽車氛圍延伸至現實空間，打造更具沉浸感的觀賽及娛樂體驗。「名燈薈萃廊」匯聚約500個知名品牌，展示多項優質照明產品。 另外，中國內地企業亦成功透過參與秋燈展開拓環球市場。中山市岩峰照明科技有限公司專注於高端原創設計及照明解決方案，其總經理兼執行長陽春華表示，秋燈展優越的國際定位及商貿配對服務，有效協助他們接觸多元化的海外買家，加速公司「出海」及全球化發展。他們已連續三年參展，期間成功結識逾200位來自東南亞、中東及南美等高增長市場的新國際客戶，充分展現展會強大的國際吸引力。繼去年成功參展後，公司交易額已達人民幣1,500萬元，並預計今年銷售額將進一步增長20%。 今年新設的「LED顯示方案」專區，旨在打造LED商用顯示生態圈，展示多項融合LED技術的商用顯示產品。其中，首次參展的本地企業雷曼香港展示榮獲 2025 TITAN Innovation Awards 金獎、集大尺寸顯示屏、視像會議及協作功能於一身的LEDHUB 智能會議解決方案，以及應用於2026年米蘭冬季奧運會的QS 系列 IceScreen LED Display。該公司的渠道拓展部總經理陸思捷表示：「秋燈展國際化程度高，能夠幫助我們接觸全球各地採購商。展會期間，公司每日對接約100位潛在客戶。目前我們正與來自亞太及南美地區的買家洽談共價值80萬美元的訂單。當中亦有來自巴拿馬的客戶，對成為雷曼本地經銷商有濃厚興趣。我們希望借助本次展會，推動潛在客戶規模增長至少20%至30%。透過展會的綜合資源優勢，我們得以發掘更多海外商機。」 秋燈展今年擴大展覽產品範圍，設立全新的「LED顯示方案」專區，旨在打造LED商用顯示生態圈。 戶外及科技照明博覽繼續帶來最新的智慧城市、工業及專業場景的照明產品應用，透過「智慧燈桿及解決方案」、「戶外、工業與技術照明」及「景觀及建築照明」三大展區，展示多元創新技術；今年更加入光伏與儲能解決方案，助力城市提升能源效益。來自中國內地的浙江方大智控科技有限公司是全球智慧照明控制器供應商之一，一直借助博覽作為「出海」的重要平台。公司行政總裁宋宏偉博士表示：「自戶外及科技照明博覽創辦以來，一直是我們拓展國際客戶群及支持我們長期全球業務擴展策略的有效渠道。我們透過這個平台成功進軍澳洲、歐洲、中東、東南亞及南美等海外市場。今年展會期間，我們與來自非洲、歐洲及東南亞的新潛在買家建立聯繫。鑑於買家反應正面，為期四天的博覽將會帶來超過100萬美元的銷售額。」 戶外及科技照明博覽匯聚多元化的戶外、商業及工業照明產品及解決方案。 來自捷克的 Precilum s.r.o.創辦人兼項目經理Radek Machalsky和銷售及業務拓展經理Jakub Machalsky親臨兩大燈展，透過秋燈兩展物色可靠供應商及優質照明產品，為公司開拓更多歐洲市場工程項目商機。他們表示：「我們找到了兩家潛在的立面照明及太陽能燈柱供應商，我們計劃透過秋燈兩展採購總值300萬美元的照明產品，將會用於明年展開的兩至三個大型照明工程。」 國際環保博覽國際化程度提升 促進綠色創科跨境合作 國際環保博覽緊貼環球綠色產業趨勢，並配合香港首個五年規劃和《施政報告2026》的政策方向，聚焦「驅動綠色能源」、「前沿綠色科技」、「築構綠色城市」及「轉廢為盈」四大領域，展示最新智慧綠色科技及解決方案。博覽的國際化程度進一步提升，雲集來自15個國家及地區、超過340家展商；展團數目亦增至18個，其中東盟館及青海展團更屬首度亮相。場內舉辦超過30場論壇和專題講座，逾80位來自世界各地的政府官員及產學研精英分享真知灼見，四日活動合共吸引超過4,400人次參加。展會期間，逾300名來自中國內地、香港、「一帶一路」及東盟國家的主要官員與半官方機構代表到場參觀，深化國際交流與聯繫。 國際環保博覽吸引逾300位來自多個國家及地區，包括中國內地、香港、肯雅、泰國及烏茲別克等地的政府官員及半官方機構代表參觀。 大會亦特別於10月27日舉行歡迎典禮，邀請中華人民共和國生態環境部部長黃潤秋、香港特別行政區政府環境及生態局局長謝展寰、香港貿發局總裁張淑芬、法蘭克福展覽（香港）有限公司副總經理黃耀倫及一眾嘉賓出席。中華人民共和國生態環境部部長黃潤秋於歡迎典禮上致辭時表示：「香港背靠祖國、聯通世界，是國家對外開放的重要門戶。我們將一如既往支持香港發揮自身優勢，共同推動粵港澳大灣區的綠色發展，高質量建設美麗中國先行區和美麗大灣區。本屆國際環保博覽以『聯通世界 共創綠色未來』為主題，恰逢其時、具有重要意義。」 為進一步加強香港與東盟市場的綠色產業聯繫，本屆博覽首設東盟館，匯聚新加坡、老撾、馬來西亞、菲律賓、印尼、泰國及越南七個東盟國家，共12家綠色科企參展。大會亦首次舉辦東盟交流酒會，邀請東盟國家的政府及業界代表出席，共同探索區域合作機遇。來自越南的生物塑料及可持續包裝製造商Turn Green Holding Joint Stock Company今年首度參展，其首席對外事務官Jonathan Sourintha表示希望接觸香港大型企業和國際買家，以出口更多產品。他說：「參觀的買家來自中國內地、阿聯酋和菲律賓等地，這些都是我們意欲開拓的目標市場。當中一位迪拜買家對我們的購物袋和垃圾袋深感興趣，若成功合作，每年訂單規模可達 20 萬美元。」 亦有買家認為博覽雲集世界各地的綠色方案，是物色海外技術與拓展跨境合作的理想平台。當中，來自新加坡的買家KLerra Pte Ltd專門為酒店及商場等商業客戶提供廢物管理與回收方案。該公司指，新加坡新推行的廚餘回收規例正帶動市場需求增長，故打算透過展會物色合適的技術方案。其執行董事 Spencer Soong表示：「我們正探索多種方案，並已物色到幾家潛在供應商，包括來自中國內地展商的廚餘管理設備、香港供應商的廢物回收及分類設備，以及越南科技公司的塑膠回收技術。預計總採購金額達120萬美元。」 約旦買家ETA MAX Energy and Environmental Solutions則認為國際環保博覽助他們接觸全球展商，發掘新供應商和擴大採購網絡。其業務發展總監Abdullah Dado提及：「現場的展商涵蓋中國內地、東亞國家、美國和加拿大，當中有兩家分別來自香港和美國的展商，其電池產品切合可靠和可持續的要求；我們計劃先投入30萬至40萬美元作首批採購，若市場反應理想，預期將進一步擴大採購規模。」 香港貿發局作為特區政府「內地企業出海專班」的核心成員，今年在博覽首設「出海全球通」專區，協助內地環保企業免費配對專業服務，與本港服務供應商拼船出海，拓展海外市場。大會亦舉辦了「出海」交流活動，包括「環保企業『走出去』經驗交流會」及「出海專題論壇」，邀請來自中國內地、香港、吉爾吉斯斯坦、馬來西亞、泰國、烏茲別克的官員、企業及香港專業服務機構，共同探討內地綠色企業的國際化發展機遇。 力合國際（香港）有限公司海外事業部項目經理黃祖權分享：「去年我們透過博覽與哈薩克斯坦簽署諒解備忘錄，成功打入中亞市場；隨後在當地成立公司，引進多款氣體監測設備，項目價值達到 200萬美元；並開展水務項目。今年再次參展，目標將『黑燈實驗室』水質分析技術推廣至香港的大學、政府實驗室及研發機構。香港客戶對這項技術深感興趣，預計相關項目金額可達 100 萬美元。本地以外，我們還接觸到馬來西亞和泰國的潛在新客戶。」力合國際指博覽匯聚國際客戶，有利他們出海發展，並視香港為內地環保企業出海的「母港」，期望以香港作為拓展海外業務的重要跳板。 不少本地綠色初創企業及學研機構，亦於博覽展出最新的綠色創新成果。其中，環境保護署支持、香港工業總會統籌的香港館共有19家本地企業參展，環境運動委員會亦帶領了22家初創參與；香港科技園公司則率領11家本地初創，帶來多款前沿能源方案。隨着綠色轉型加速，各界對綠色產品及技術的需求日增，博覽亦吸引不同行業的買家及多家大型企業到場採購洽商。首次參展的怡斯萊有限公司企業及市場傳訊總監簡栢倫指出：「希望透過博覽的國際影響力，向更多海外買家介紹技術，並物色潛在合作夥伴。我們在展會首三天已錄得超過200人次參觀，接觸到中國內地、加拿大、丹麥、印度、以色列、泰國、美國和越南等近20個國家和地區的買家。其中，加拿大和丹麥的買家有興趣採購我們的機器和技術；亦有多位中國內地的政府官員和相關機構，查詢將廢棄原料轉化為能源的技術，以及減碳方案，相信博覽可為我們帶來更多商務合作機會。」 博覽期間舉辦一系列專業論壇及研討會，邀請業界翹楚分享真知灼見。英國Gresham College榮譽教授兼氣候金融高級專家組成員Avinash Persaud教授在博覽上表示：「香港在引導私人資本流向全球成本相宜、安全可靠的能源項目方面，扮演着關鍵角色。」他補充：「隨着能源發展逐漸以商品為本轉向科技為本，行業將更依賴新一代環保從業員、工程師及科學人才推動變革。」他讚揚香港工程師學會（HKIE）及香港合資格環保專業人員學會（HKIQEP）致力推動行業專業化，樹立優秀標準，為業界提供典範。他續指：「多年來，國際環保博覽匯聚政策制定者、監管機構、私營企業、業內人士、學者、開發銀行及投資者，建立可信平台，促進理念交流及發展，為建立亞洲新能源技術生態圈發揮關鍵作用。」 兩大燈展期間舉辦多場研討會及論壇，其中，「創新照明設計論壇」邀得三位曾參與國際地標項目的照明設計大師分享最新趨勢，包括曾參與巴黎羅浮宮及北京故宮等項目的昂特設計中國區設計總監劉彥博士(右二)；領導大都會藝術博物館及M+照明設計的MEGS Lighting照明設計師Adam Meredith(右一)；以及負責多個埃及金字塔照明設計的昕諾飛非洲區照明設計經理Omar Elkerm(左二)。大會聯同香港旅遊發展局（展覽推廣合作夥伴）於展會期間安排維多利亞港晚間航遊，提升會展旅客的商旅體驗。 除了旗艦活動「亞洲環保會議」，大會亦與環境保護署緊密合作，不但組織本港政府部門及相關機構參觀展會，亦安排多個政府部門於論壇上分享採購需求，讓業界更掌握市場方向，研發切合所需的綠色方案與技術，促進公私營機構協作。參與政府部門論壇的上海萬江環境科技有限公司董事長徐強形容，香港在技術細節和規格方面採用的標準與中國內地不同，活動讓內地製造商更了解國際市場標準，讓產品和方案更能配合最新的政策需求。他期望透過與本地大學等機構合作試點項目，建立「香港製造」的示範案例，繼而進一步開拓香港以外的市場。 「亞洲環保會議」其中一個環節邀請到機電工程署、華僑銀行（香港）、南豐發展及施耐德電氣（香港）的代表，一同探討綠色金融如何透過資金支持綠色建築、節能改造及零碳轉型，共同打造高效能及可持續的城市基建。ANSO 環境科技產業聯盟負責人兼中國科學院生態環境研究中心環境科技海外合作中心主任楊敏教授、香港特別行政區政府環境保護署首席環境保護主任（部門事務）吳慧妍博士及湖南省生態環境廳二級巡視員鍾進出席「環保企業『走出去』經驗交流會」，並邀得烏茲別克廢棄物管理局、吉爾吉斯斯坦天然資源、生態和技術監督部、投資推廣署、中國水環境集團、力合科技、泰國國家發展管理研究院及中原生態環境技術創新中心的代表發表主題演講，分享出海經驗，助環保企業拓闊國際網絡。 三展融合線上線下渠道拓闊商機 香港國際秋季燈飾展和香港國際戶外及科技照明博覽由香港貿發局主辦，組成全球矚目的燈飾盛會，兩展匯聚來自超過20個國家及地區約3,000家參展商，分別吸引約39,000及超過11,000名買家參觀採購。國際環保博覽則由香港貿發局與法蘭克福展覽（香港）有限公司合辦，並由香港特別行政區政府環境及生態局協辦，共有來自15個國家及地區，超過340家參展商，逾11,000名買家參觀採購。 國際環保博覽共吸引來自15個國家及地區，超過340家展商，逾11,000買家參觀採購。圖為中華人民共和國生態環境部部長黃潤秋、香港特別行政區政府環境及生態局局長謝展寰、香港貿發局總裁張淑芬、法蘭克福展覽（香港）有限公司副總經理黃耀倫及一眾嘉賓，出席國際環保博覽歡迎典禮盛況。環境及生態局聯同環境保護署及另外九個政府部門組成特區政府館，展示多項最新環保政策及措施，以及環保理念的實踐。國際環保博覽最後一天為公眾日，市民免費入場，參與互動環保工作坊及就業講座。 三項展覽均以「展覽+」（ EXHIBITION+） 線上線下融合模式舉行，展商及買家可透過「商對易」（Click2Match）智能配對平台進行線上洽商，國際環保博覽的網上展期舉行至11月5日，秋燈展及戶外及科技照明博覽則是直至11月6日。 展覽網頁 香港國際秋季燈飾展： hklightingfairae.hktdc.com/tc 香港國際戶外及科技照明博覽：hkotlexpo.hktdc.com/tc 國際環保博覽：www.ecoexpoasia.com 更多展商及買家成功故事 香港國際秋季燈飾展： https://www.hktdc.com/event/hklightingfairae/tc/success-stories 香港國際戶外及科技照明博覽： https://www.hktdc.com/event/hkotlexpo/tc/success-stories 國際環保博覽： https://www.hktdc.com/event/ecoexpoasia/tc/success-stories 圖片下載： https://bit.ly/3WdWx6Q 傳媒查詢： 香港貿易發展局傳訊及公共事務部： 李蔚楠 電話：(852) 2584 4369 電郵︰[email protected] 袁諾曦 電話：(852) 2584 4575 電郵：[email protected] 張敏萱 電話︰(852) 2584 4137 電郵︰[email protected] 香港貿發局新聞中心：http://mediaroom.hktdc.com/tc 香港貿易發展局簡介 香港貿易發展局(香港貿發局)今年慶祝成立60周年！成立於1966年，香港貿發局是負責促進、協助和發展香港貿易的法定機構。香港貿發局在世界各地設有超過50個辦事處，其中13個設於中國內地，致力推廣本港作為雙向環球投資及商業樞紐。 香港貿發局通過舉辦國際展覽會、會議及商貿考察團，為企業(尤其是中小企)開拓內地和環球市場的機遇。香港貿發局亦通過研究報告和數碼資訊平台，提供最新的市場分析和產品資訊。有關香港貿發局的其他資訊，請瀏覽www.hktdc.com/aboutus/tc。 法蘭克福展覽集團簡介 法蘭克福展覽集團是全球最大的擁有自主展覽場地的展會主辦機構，其業務涵蓋展覽會、會議及活動，在全球29個地區聘用約2,700名員工，業務版圖遍及世界各地。2025年營業額約7.66億歐元，集團與眾多產業領域建立了豐富的全球商貿網絡並保持緊密聯繫，在展覽活動、場地和服務業務領域，高效滿足客戶的商業利益和全方位需求。法蘭克福展覽集團核心優勢在於遍佈世界各地龐大、緊密的國際行銷網絡，覆蓋全球約180個國家。多元化的服務呈現在活動現場及網路平台的各個環節，確保遍佈世界各地的客戶在策劃、組織及進行活動時，能持續享受到高品質及靈活性。集團正在透過新的商業模式積極拓展數位化服務範疇，可提供的服務類型包括租用展覽場地、展覽搭建、市場推廣、人力安排以及餐飲供應。作為核心策略體系之一，集團積極實踐永續經營理念，在生態、經濟利益、社會責任和多樣性之間達成有益的平衡。有關集團可持續發展進一步資料，請瀏覽網頁：www.messefrankfurt.com/sustainability。總部位於德國法蘭克福市，由該市和黑森州政府分別控股60%和40%。 有關公司進一步資料，請瀏覽網頁：集團www.messefrankfurt.com.hk。
  5. FinanceMicroVision Expands Collaboration with FieldAI Across Government and Industrial Autonomous Systems ProgramsOrlando, FL, Nov 2, 2026 - MicroVision, Inc. (NASDAQ: MVIS), a leader in advanced perception solutions for industrial, security and defense, and automotive applications, today announced an expanded collaboration with FieldAI, a developer of autonomous robotic systems for government and industrial applications. The collaboration builds on successful testing of MicroVision's perception technologies by FieldAI's Federal team, including evaluation of the IRIS™ long-range lidar sensor on autonomous ground vehicles and demonstrations of MicroVision's extended perception solution combining the Robinson Unmanned Spirit drone platform with the MOVIA™ Air Plus sensor for real-time, colorized 3D lidar mapping integrated with ATAK. In addition, FieldAI has purchased MicroVision MOVIA sensors for development and evaluation activities spanning both government and industrial autonomous robotics initiatives. "FieldAI is pioneering autonomous systems designed for some of the most demanding operational environments, and we're excited to continue expanding our collaboration across both their Federal and Industrial organizations," said Glen DeVos, CEO of MicroVision. "From long-range perception for autonomous ground vehicles to real-time 3D mapping and short-range obstacle detection, our portfolio provides the flexibility and performance required to support next-generation robotic systems. We look forward to supporting FieldAI as they continue advancing autonomy across commercial and government applications." "The performance and versatility of MicroVision's sensing technologies have made them an important collaborator as we continue advancing autonomous capabilities across our platform portfolio," said Shehryar Khattak, Director of Technology at FieldAI. "Following successful tests across uncrewed ground and aerial systems, we are expanding our evaluation efforts to identify opportunities for broader adoption of MicroVision's perception solutions across both our Federal and Industrial programs." The collaboration reflects growing demand for advanced perception solutions capable of supporting autonomous mobility, navigation, mapping, obstacle detection, and mission execution across government and industrial robotic platforms. By combining MicroVision's portfolio of long-range, short-range, and aerial perception solutions with FieldAI's autonomy software and robotic systems expertise, the companies are exploring opportunities to accelerate deployment of next-generation autonomous capabilities in challenging operational environments. About Field AI FieldAI is the leader in deploying general-purpose robots in unstructured environments, providing frontier autonomy software as a universal "brain" that works across many robots and many tasks. The company's Field Foundation Models™ uniquely combine data-driven AI with physics-based reasoning and uncertainty awareness, enabling safe and reliable operations in environments previously considered too unpredictable for robots. FieldAI's leadership team brings together world-class expertise in AI foundation models and real-world robotics, with roots in Google DeepMind, NASA JPL's Mars exploration program, and DARPA's Subterranean Challenge and RACER programs. The company has raised over $400 million from investors including Bezos Expeditions, Emerson Collective, Khosla Ventures, Canaan Partners, NVentures (NVIDIA's venture capital arm), Prysm Capital, Temasek, and others. For more information, visitwww.fieldai.com or contact [email protected]. About MicroVision MicroVision is defining the next generation of lidar-based perception solutions for industrial, security & defense, and automotive markets. As the industry moves beyond proof of concept toward value, deployment, and commercialization, MicroVision delivers integrated hardware and software solutions designed for real-world performance, automotive-grade reliability, and economic scalability. With engineering centers in the U.S. and Germany, MicroVision leads the industry in depth and breadth of its portfolio, with both short- and long-range lidar solutions, featuring solid-state sensors with varying wavelengths, advanced sensor architectures, design-to-cost engineering, and open software solutions. For more information, visit the company's website at www.microvision.com, on Facebook at www.facebook.com/microvisioninc, and LinkedIn at https://www.linkedin.com/company/microvision/. MicroVision, MicroVision HALO, IRIS, MOVIA, MOSAIK, and SENTINEL are trademarks of MicroVision, Inc., and SCANTINEL is a trademark of Scantinel GmbH, in the United States and other countries. All other trademarks are the property of their respective owners. Investor Relations Contact: Jeff Christensen Darrow Associates Investor Relations [email protected] Media Contact Heidi Davidson - For MicroVision [email protected] (914) 441-6862
  6. Government & policyIndonesia Says It Has Too Much Rice. Three Official Numbers Say OtherwiseHONG KONG, Nov 1, 2026 - On 30 September 2026, workers at a Bulog warehouse in Balikpapan, East Kalimantan, were photographed checking rice stocks. The picture ran with a story that has become routine in Jakarta this year: state procurement had passed 4.11 million tonnes of farmers' rice, beating the 4 million tonne target for the whole of 2026 with three months to spare, and the national reserve had touched about 5.4 million tonnes, the highest since independence. The same week, the government said something larger. Indonesia had reached rice self-sufficiency, the 2026 import order was cancelled, a programme to clear forest for new rice fields was being wound down, and officials were exploring premium rice exports to Malaysia. The reserve, readers were told, covers demand into the first quarter of 2027. All of that may be true. The problem is narrower and more awkward. The four numbers doing the work in those two paragraphs, production, self-sufficiency, reserve and consumption, come from different agencies, use different denominators, and in at least one case cannot all be true at the same time. This piece takes them one at a time and checks whether they add up. Where they do not, the gap is not a scandal. It is a measurement problem that the policy has already spent money against. The Claim, Quoted Precisely Hasil Sembiring, special adviser to the agriculture minister for production enhancement, put the case on the record at a Jakarta briefing on 10 August 2026. Output had risen, reserves were stronger, incentives had improved, and the country was on a path to a more productive and self-sufficient food system. The numbers behind that sentence, as published by the statistics agency and relayed by state media, are these. Paddy output reached 34.69 million tonnes in 2025, against 30.62 million tonnes in 2024, a gain of 13.29%. Harvested area rose to 11.32 million hectares from 10.05 million. The food self-sufficiency ratio moved from 87.14% in 2024 to 110.25% in 2025. Those are not forecasts. They are presented as measured outcomes. Two of them, the production total and the ratio, are the load-bearing claims for everything that follows: the cancelled import, the export trial, the wind-down of land clearing. The 13.29% Is a Land Story, Not a Yield Story Start with the easiest check, because it is pure division. Divide 34.69 million tonnes by 11.32 million hectares and output per hectare comes to 3.06 tonnes. Do the same for 2024: 30.62 divided by 10.05 gives 3.05 tonnes. The difference is under one percent. Harvested area, meanwhile, rose 12.6% in a single year. That is a very large movement in a country where new paddy land is scarce and where the government has been trying to stop converting forest into fields. It is possible. It is also the kind of number that usually comes from a change in how area is counted rather than from 1.27 million new hectares appearing between two harvests. The library decomposition used for this piece puts 94.8% of the 2025 output gain on area and 5.2% on yield. The published totals support that split. They do not support a story about farmers getting more rice from the same ground, which is the version usually told, because yield did not move. This matters for the policy, not just for the ledger. Area-led growth has a hard ceiling and a political cost, since the cheapest remaining land is forest. Yield-led growth does not. If the 13.29% came from area, then the 2026 target inherits a problem: the same trick cannot be run twice without more land, and the land programme is being closed. Three Forecasts for One Harvest, 23.3% Apart The 2026 numbers get worse before they get better. Three published forecasts exist for the same crop year, and they do not describe the same country. Table 1: What three published sources project for Indonesia's 2026 paddy crop Source 2026 paddy output (million tonnes) Stated basis Bapanas, via ANTARA 31.3 Food agency projection Asia Daily, citing agency data 34.77 Reported projection ANTARA, 2026-2027 outlook 38.6 Reported projection Source: ANTARA 🔗, August 2026; agency projections as reported. The gap between the low and high figure is 23.3%. On a base of roughly 35 million tonnes that is about 7.3 million tonnes, or more than the entire national reserve at its record peak. A country that cannot say within 7 million tonnes how much rice it will grow this year is not in a position to cancel imports on the strength of the forecast. The low end deserves particular attention because of who produced it. A 31.3 million tonne crop would be below the 2025 outturn of 34.69 million, which means the food agency's own projection implies a 9.8% decline in the year the government declared self-sufficiency and stopped importing. Either the projection is conservative, or the declaration rests on a crop the agency does not expect. The high end, 38.6 million tonnes, would be a 11.3% increase on 2025 and would require another area jump on top of the one that just happened. Nothing in the procurement data suggests that is under way: Bulog's 4.11 million tonnes bought from farmers is strong, but it is a purchase number, not a production number, and it can rise while output falls if farmers choose to sell to the state instead of to traders. The Ratio That Cannot Hold Now the self-sufficiency ratio, which is the number most quoted and the least examined. The series runs 91.04% to 98.88% across 2020 to 2023, drops to 87.14% in 2024, then leaps to 110.25% in 2025. A 23.1 point move in twelve months. A ratio of production to consumption is only as good as its denominator, and the denominator here is not published with the ratio. But it can be recovered by division. At 110.25%, a 34.69 million tonne crop implies national consumption of 31.47 million tonnes. At 87.14%, a 30.62 million tonne crop implies consumption of 35.14 million tonnes. Put those two implied figures side by side and the problem appears. Consumption would have fallen 10.4% in one year, from 35.14 to 31.47 million tonnes, in a country whose population grew, whose free meal programme expanded to 83 million beneficiaries, and whose government was simultaneously worried about feeding people. A 10.4% drop in rice consumption in a single year has no plausible mechanism. Households do not halve their rice. The free nutritious meals programme, budgeted at IDR 335 trillion for 2026 and covering 83 million people, adds demand rather than removing it, at roughly IDR 304 per person per day on the programme's own arithmetic. So one of the two ratios is wrong, or the two are computed on different bases. Since both are attributed to the same agency and the same methodology family, the likeliest explanation is a denominator that changed definition between years, most probably a shift between "production available for food" and gross paddy output, or a change in the conversion rate from paddy to milled rice. There is a third witness. The government's own working figure for national rice consumption is 2.5 million tonnes a month, which is 30 million tonnes a year. Against 34.69 million tonnes of paddy that is a ratio of about 115.6%, not 110.25%. Against 31.3 million tonnes of forecast 2026 output it is 104.3%, and against a milled-rice conversion, which is how consumption is actually measured, it falls below 100%. Three official anchors, 110.25%, 115.6% and 104.3%, none of which is the number in the press release. Reserves, and the Difference Between a Stock and a Buffer The reserve numbers are the strongest part of the government's case, and they are internally consistent in a way the ratios are not. Table 2: Government rice reserve by release date, with the stated target for comparison Date Government reserve (million tonnes) Note 2025 target 4.0 Annual target 2025-12-31 3.248 Year-end stock 2026-01-07 3.25 Start of year 2026-06-18 5.2 Post-harvest build 2026-07-30 5.25 Record at the time 2026-10-09 5.4 Peak since independence Source: Shangbao Indonesia 🔗, 9 October 2026; earlier figures from state media as compiled. The build from 3.25 to 5.4 million tonnes in nine months is real, and it was bought at IDR 6,500 per kilogram, a floor price that protects farmers and costs the budget money on every tonne. The 2026 food security budget is IDR 210.4 trillion, up from IDR 139.4 trillion in 2025. Here is the catch. A 5.4 million tonne reserve against 2.5 million tonnes of monthly consumption is 2.2 months of cover, not the "into the first quarter of 2027" that the coverage language implies. To reach the first quarter of 2027 from October 2026 requires about five months. The national figure that does reach five months, 12.53 million tonnes total stock on 7 January 2026, includes household and trader inventories, which the government does not control and cannot release. Government reserve coverage at that January date, on the same arithmetic, was 1.3 months. That is the number that governs what happens in a bad year. It has improved since, to roughly 2.2 months, and it is still not five. Self-Sufficiency in One Commodity, Imports in the Rest The word in the announcement is food, but the number behind it is rice. That distinction is where the policy gets expensive. Indonesia tracks 11 strategic food commodities. Eight of them are reported as running a production surplus in 2026. Rice is one. The three that are not are the ones that show up in the import bill every year, and they are not small: soybean imports are projected at 26.4 million tonnes for 2026, garlic at 679,895 tonnes, beef at 321,660 tonnes. Those are forecasts, and they should be read as forecasts, but the direction has been stable for a decade. Soybean is the awkward one, because it is not a luxury. Tempeh and tofu are the cheapest protein in the country and they are made from imported beans. A rice surplus of 3 million tonnes and a soybean deficit of 26 million tonnes are not the same kind of achievement, and no ratio that averages them is useful. The free nutritious meals programme sharpens the point. Budgeted at IDR 335 trillion for 2026 and reaching 83 million people, it is the largest demand-side intervention in Indonesian food since the 1998 crisis. Its per capita allocation works out to about IDR 304 a day, which buys roughly a fifth of a kilogram of rice at the procurement floor price, or a portion of eggs, or a small piece of fish. The programme's kitchen-level sourcing decisions, not the paddy harvest, will determine whether it lifts protein consumption or simply adds volume to the rice channel. There is also a labour question hidden in the area story. If 1.27 million additional hectares were harvested in 2025, someone planted and cut them. Indonesian agriculture has been losing workers to manufacturing and services for a decade, and the harvest labour market is already tight in the main producing provinces during the peak season. An area-led expansion is therefore not just a land constraint. It is a labour constraint that shows up as a wage bill two seasons later. None of this is an argument against the reserve. Buying 4.11 million tonnes at IDR 6,500 protects farmers from the price collapse that a big harvest normally brings, and that is a legitimate use of a state buyer. The argument is about which number gets used to justify the next decision. A rice surplus is not food security. It is a rice surplus, in one commodity, in one year, produced mostly by putting more land under the crop. Where the Numbers Cannot Coexist Three specific incompatibilities, stated as plainly as possible. First, a 2025 self-sufficiency ratio of 110.25% and a 2026 production forecast of 31.3 million tonnes cannot both be right unless consumption collapses by a further 9% in 2026. The ratio says the country has a surplus. The forecast says next year's crop is smaller than this year's consumption. Second, the decision to cancel the 2026 rice import sits on top of that forecast, not on top of the 2025 outturn. Imports are bought against the coming year. If the food agency's own projection is 31.3 million tonnes and consumption is 31.47 million tonnes at the 110.25% denominator, there is no surplus to export and very little to hold. Third, the export initiative to Malaysia has no volume behind it that survives the reserve math. Every tonne exported comes out of a 5.4 million tonne stock that represents 2.2 months of cover. A country with 2.2 months of buffer does not have exportable surplus, whatever its ratio says. None of this means Indonesia is short of rice today. Bulog bought 4.11 million tonnes, the reserve is at a record, prices were defended at the farm gate, and the harvest was large. It means the four numbers used to describe that success are drawn from four different frames, and the frame that gets quoted, the ratio, is the one that moves the most and is explained the least. The Fraud Cases That Make the Optimism Expensive There is a reason to be strict about agricultural statistics in Indonesia that goes beyond bookkeeping, and it is sitting in the court records. eFishery, once valued at USD 1.4 billion, collapsed after revenue irregularities surfaced at the end of 2024. Its founder was sentenced to nine years in April 2026; prosecutors had sought ten. Cumulative funding was about USD 415 million across four rounds, and investor losses are put at roughly USD 300 million. A fine of IDR 1 billion was imposed, a sum that rounds to nothing against the losses. TaniHub is the second case, and the more instructive one. Six defendants were sentenced in June 2026: the founder to nine years, the finance director to seven, a former MDI Ventures chief executive to five, and a former BRI Ventures chief executive to three. State losses were assessed at USD 25 million, against USD 20 million from MDI and USD 5 million from BRI Ventures. The company had been valued at USD 218 million in May 2021. Its lending arm reached a non-performing loan ratio of 63.9% in 2023, was restricted by the regulator in April 2023, and lost its licence in May 2024. Bad loans of IDR 693 billion, operating losses of IDR 437 billion, and overstated earnings of IDR 359 billion are all in the file. The pattern is the one that matters for statistics: a lending book, a valuation and a growth story that all depended on numbers nobody outside the company could check. Agricultural data in Indonesia is harder to falsify than a fintech loan book, because the statistics agency does sample surveys. But the same reflex, treating an unverified number as a settled one because the policy needs it, is what produced a 23 point jump in a ratio that no one has published a denominator for. What Would Prove This Wrong The argument here is that the 110.25% ratio is a measurement artefact, that the 2026 crop is smaller than the 2025 crop, and that the reserve is thinner than the coverage language suggests. Four observations would settle it against me. If the statistics agency publishes, before the end of 2026, a methodology note that fixes the consumption denominator and shows both years on the same basis, with 2024 also above 100%, then the jump is a revision and not an artefact. Watch for a restated 2024 figure. If Bulog's procurement for the full 2026 season exceeds 5 million tonnes without a further price increase above IDR 6,500, then the crop is genuinely larger than the low forecast and the area expansion was real. If the government publishes monthly rice stock including household and trader inventories for two consecutive quarters and the government share of that total rises above 45%, the reserve is deeper than 2.2 months of cover implies. And if an actual export contract to Malaysia is signed and shipped, with a volume and a date, then there is exportable surplus and this piece is wrong about the arithmetic. Not the announcement of intent. The bill of lading. Methodology Data as of October 2026. Three denominators are in play and they are not interchangeable. The self-sufficiency ratio is treated here as production divided by consumption; the consumption figure is never published, so it is recovered by dividing published output by the published ratio, which is exact arithmetic on two stated numbers and inherits any rounding in the ratio. Per hectare output divides paddy output by harvested area, both from the statistics agency as relayed by state media, and is a gross paddy measure, not milled rice. The paddy to milled conversion is not applied anywhere in this piece, because the conversion rate is not stated in the sources; where a milled comparison would change a conclusion, the text says so. Reserve coverage divides the government-held stock by the stated monthly consumption of 2.5 million tonnes, and excludes household and trader inventories, which is why it differs from the national stock coverage figure. The 94.8% / 5.2% decomposition is a library calculation from the area and output totals, and the direct per hectare arithmetic is shown so a reader can check it independently. Cost figures are nominal rupiah, not inflation adjusted. Limitations The three 2026 forecasts are attributed to different intermediaries and may not share a cut-off date, so part of the 23.3% spread could be timing. The consumption denominator is inferred, not published, which means the 10.4% implied drop is a property of the ratios rather than a measured fact. And the reserve series mixes target, year-end and intra-year figures from different releases, so the month-to-month path is indicative. Sources · ANTARA 🔗, Indonesia confident on food security outlook as farm output rises, 10 August 2026 · Shangbao Indonesia 🔗, Bulog procures 4.11 million tonnes, reserve peak 5.4 million, 9 October 2026 · CNA 🔗, TaniHub case verdict and investor losses, June 2026 · The Straits Times 🔗, eFishery founder sentenced to nine years, April 2026 · Agency production and area statistics for 2024 and 2025 as relayed by ANTARA, no public dataset link (no public link) This article was prepared by the expert team at Global Infinity Labs, drawing on insights and data provided through its MCP data services. About Global Infinity Labs Global Infinity Labs is an AI innovation company specializing in MCP data services. Email: [email protected]